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There is no document of civilization which is not at 
the same time a document of barbarism. 
-Walter Benjamin, 
Theses on the Philosophy ofHistory 
Speaking far outside the realm of political theory, Donald 
Davidson once claimed that it is only upon some basic agreement 
that true clisagreement can be founded (Davidson). Though they 
represent clivergent strains-the continentaland the analytic-within 
contemporary philosophy, the interpretations of the Age of Enlight­
enment offered by Hannah Arendt and Alasdair MacIntyre parallel 
one another in surprising ways. Each characterizes the "Rights of 
Man"proclaimedby Robespierre andJeffersonas empty, ungrounded 
and insufficiently protected to found the new moral and political 
order devised in Europe's 18th century revolutions. With this paral­
lel as a backdrop, I will develop a brief MacIntyrean critique of 
Arendt to bring her work into better focus. This critique claims 
Arendt is insensitive to some of the fantastic philosophical upheav­
als from Aristotle, St. Augustine and Aquinas to Kant, Diderot and 
Hume that led to the Enlightenment's ultimate demise. I then pro­
pose a quick Arendtian response to this cd ticism: wi th an addition of 
some philosophical work, with a quantitative change, Arendt's En­
lightenment work would satisfy the Maclntyrean argument I em­
ploy. It then becomes clear that though Arendt can respond to this 
argument throughsuch quantitati ve changes, the Maclntyreanmight 
lack such a response to the Arendtian criticisms I propose. To satisfy 
Arendt, MacIntyre would be required to transform his work, to make 
not simply quantitative but qualitative, even fundamental, changes in 
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After Virtue. Though MacIntyre sees the Enlightenment project's 
failure as philosophical in nature, Arendt characterizes the emptiness 
of rights rhetoric born from the American and French revolutions as 
political incharacter. This Arendtian response to MacIntyre facilitates 
a deeper presentation of some of the more subtle points in Arendt's 
interpretation of the Enlightenment. From an Arendtian standpoint, 
MacIntyre mischaracterizes the very nature of the failure embodied 
in the Age of Enlightenment, the failure that she thought led to the 
rise of fascism, such as the Nazism she fled and fought throughout 
the early years of her life. 
I. Arendt's Critique of Rights 
Hunchback: "You know Marshall, I used tobe a Jew." 
Marshall: "Oh really? ... I used to be a hunchback." 
-Groucho Marx, Groucho at Carnegie Hall 
The European revolutions of the 18th century brought the proc­
lamation of a series of rights, such as the rights of man and the citizen 
in France and rights endowed in every human by their Creator in 
America. These were extensively explicated and critiqued by Arendt, 
particularly in the book that made her famous in America, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism. There, Arendt argues that though the 
newly established American and French nation-states introduced 
and claimed to foster human rights, historically they have protected 
only citizen's or national rights, such that the "loss of national rights 
in all instances entail[edl the loss of human rights," and, in turn, that 
human rights could be guaranteed only through "national emanci­
pation" (OT, pp. 299,291).1 As these citizenship rights were extended 
to increasingly large sections of European and American popula­
tions, assirnilationist-rnindedJews on the Continent gladly accepted 
the barmer of civil rights, as for them it represented the best bulwark 
against an ever-present European anti-semitism. By the close of the 
18th century, bourgeois Jewry often exhibited a great faith, some­
what naive in Arendt's view, in their respective states and a willing­
ness to assimilate themselves into French or German cullure to 
demonstrate their allegiance to the nations that had recently em an­
1 Cf. also Benhabib, S. "Hannah Arendt and the Redemptive Power of Narra­
tive," Social Research Vol. 57 Spring 1990; pp. 167-68. 
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cipated them.2Jews were willing to "adjustin principle to everything 
and everybody," a sentiment that meant, in the Europe of the early 
19th century, a willingness to accept emancipation and the newly 
established civil rights as assimilated members of European nation­
states (JP, p. 63). 
As Arendt demonstrates in her biography, Rahel Vamlzagm, the 
assimilationists, or parvenus, attempted both social and cultural 
integration into the European bourgeoisie on individual bases: each 
denied his or her Jewish identity and became faceless members of 
civil society (RV, pp. 26, 30, 85; cf. IF, p. 85). In this way, of course, 
assimilated Jews exemplified the condition of modernity: though 
they suffered communally at the hands of anti-semitism-that is, it 
was as Jews that they suffered-they chose to fight this oppression 
individually, apolitically, as atomized individuals.3 At first, Arendt's 
Rahel first embraces this tactic of assimilation into German culture 
by attempting to renounce and to deny, even in the privateness of her 
diary, her Jewish identity. This attempt ultimately brings her face to 
face with a paradoxical and deeply disturbing reality: Rahel realizes 
that to truly assimilate into anti-semitic German or European cul­
ture, she must become an anti-semite. At this prospect, Rahel recoils 
andchooses instead to maintain her Jewishness in the face ofboth the 
anti-semitism of German culture and the many parvenus who fre­
,quent her salon (RV, pp. 216, 224). This was, in Arendt's view, an 
admirable and conscious choice on Rahel's part. In contrast to 
Rahel's perseverance, many Jews gave in to assimilation, but this 
very assimilation, if taken to mean a complete integration into 
bourgeois Christian culture, and the loss of all Jewish characteristics, 
ended in failure. European Jews could not, despite their best efforts, 
relinquish their Jewishness.4 Kurt Blumenfeld called this the "objec­
tive Jewish question," the inescapability of Judaism for European 
Jews (Blumenfeld in Young-Bruehl, p. 72). 
On a broader historical scale, Arendt's work demonstrates the 
~ For the Jewish "faith" in European nation states, see Ron Feldman's introduc­
tion to IP, p. 27; for Arendt's comments, see IP, pp. 63-64. 
3 For Arendt's view of the atomization prevalent in modernity, see He p. 5~ff, 
p.21Off· 
4 Arendt writes of "the history of a hundred and fifty years of assimilatedJewry 
who performed an unprecedented feat: though proving all the time their non­
Jewishness, they succeeded in remaining Jews all the same" UP, p.64). 
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truly dialectical dilemma of modem Jewry and its relation to the 
failure of the Enlightenment to establish a moral foundation for 
politics and a bulwark against recurrent bouts of anti-semitic vio­
lence throughout Europe. Under modernity, Jews joined and were 
swept up ina dialectical movement of great proportions: those Jews 
who rejected their given pariah status opted to become the assimi­
lated parvenus Rahel knew so welL The pariah Jews rejected the 
parvenu tactic of assimilation into European bourgeois culture as 
fervently as their assimilationist cousins defined themselves over 
andagainst the masses of Europe 'spoor Jewry, especially its Ostjuden. 
Hence, an antithesis of identities and of social roles grew historically 
within the Jewish community. particularly for the Jews in Germany 
that remain Arendt's focus. These antithetical poles of Jewish history 
and identity were synthesized under Nazism, where all Jews, re­
gardless of social status, were rendered Jews per se and en masse, and 
murdered as such UP, p. 90). In the concentration camp. we see the 
final proof that the very pariah/parvenu distinction Jews struggled 
for two centuries to maintain proved, in the last analysis, irrelevant. 5 
This history forms a centerpiece of the Enlightenment and its 
rights legacy as Arendt saw it, for the only rights available in Europe 
were national rights. and Jews, even the parvenus, never fully emerged 
as accepted na tional ci tizens. Here we reach the terrifying possi bility 
that. ifstripped of their newly -found and still tenuous civil rights. the 
Jews would sit naked, rightless, vulnerable. On Arendt's view, the 
Nazis understood and exploited this peculiar situation of European 
Jewry, a result of the Enlightenment's limited protection of the 
peoples under its tutelage. Indeed, long before the Final Solution, 
Hitler's regime moved in the early 1930s to strip Jews of their civil 
rights as German citizens, which they knew would remove their 
"legal status" altogether, rendering Jews de facto and de jure rightless 
(OT, p. 296).6 In Arendt's estimation, the anti-Jewish Nuremberg 
Laws of1935 violated nothuman but national rights (El, p.268). These 
political moves of the 30s paved the way, of course, for the rapid 
expulsion, forced concentration and final extermination of Germany' s 
5 As Arendt writes in Eicl111Ul1l1l in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality ofEvt7 , for 
the Nazis, "aJew is aJew." 
(, Cf. also £/, p. 138: "In nearly all countries, anti-Jewish action started with 
stateless persons." 
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and Europe's Jewish populations.7 It was always stateless Jews, and 
other so-called enemies of the Reich with refugee status, who met 
with their death first, for they lacked the only political protection 
available in Europe at that time. indeed the only protection available 
since the Enlightenment erupted (EI. p. 191 passim). It is, of course, 
with great irony that Arendt notes how Adolf Eichmann could only 
be tried before the Jerusalem court because he too was stateless, a 
mere foreign national in Argentina, a man unclaimed and unpro­
tected by the Federal Republic of Germany and left to face Israel's 
judgment (E/. p. 240). 
Here Arendt's critique of the Enlightenment and of the rights 
rhetoric it generated becomes clear: because of the solely national 
protection of rights, Jews and other refugees stripped oftheir citizen­
ship "had lost those rights which had been thought of and even 
defined as inalienable, namely the Rights of Man" (OT, p. 268). With 
respect to the masses of new refugees roaming Europe in the 1930s 
and early 1940s, Arendt demonstrates how the condition of modern 
Jewry became the condition of modernity for many Europeans, how 
the two were suddenly united in their stateless and rightless predica­
ment (JP. p. 20. 66). Arendt emphasizes unequivocally that the 
Enlightenment's failure to estab Ush and protect human rights set the 
precedent for this catastrophe. The holocaust brought an end to the 
cultural distinctions Jews had fostered among themselves, an end to 
Jewish hope for the future promised under civil emancipation in 
Europe, indeed the "end of the world" for European Jewry (El, p. 
153). And perhaps most radically, it meant the end of the Age of 
Enlightenment and its legacy. 
II. Macintyre's Interpretation of the Enlightenment 
With the publication ofAJter Virtue in 1981, Alasdair MacIntyre 
emerged as a strong critic of the contemporary scene in analytic 
moral philosophy, particularly of the moral precepts he thought we 
have inherited from the Aristotelian project of grounding morality in 
rationality and human nature. We see a close affinity between the 
Enlightenment critiques of MacIntyre and Arendt: both demonstrate 
7 For these three stages in the Nazi program against European Jewry. d. El. 
chapters 4. 5 & 6. 
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the emptiness of contemporary rights rhetoric in relation to the 
Enlightenment project of extending inalienable or natural Rights to 
hurnani ty. Though Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant or Jefferson 
took Rights to be inextinguishable, as the foundational moments of 
morality and politics, Arendt and MacIntyre both contend that such 
rights do not exist inherently and that they are dependent onpolitical 
communities and the social institutions that support them.8 On a 
grandscale, Arendt and MacIntyre characterize the late-20th century 
as a "post" era: for MacIntyre "post-Enlightenment," for Arendt 
"post -tra ditional," an era that is witness to the sinking of Europe and 
the Americas into moral and intellectual chaos,9 into an age without 
authority, tradition (Arendt), or the necessary grounding incoherent 
views of hwnan nature (MacIntyre). Because of these parallels, I 
want to construct a criticism of Arendt's analysis from within 
MacIntyre's project, a critique centered on Arendt's view of the 
Enlightenment, pushing that analysis into greater focus and giving 
it greater clarity against the background of After Virtue. First, I will 
briefly outline MacIntyre's narrative of the Enlightenment. 
In After Virtue. MacIntyre delineates precisely how moral dis­
course fell into its present predicament of emptily asserting rights 
and moral precepts-largely inherited from Arlstotelianism and 
Christianity-without properly grounding them in coherent con­
ceptions of human nature and rationality. MacIntyre the Aristotelian 
tra vels, not surprisingly, to fourth century B.C. Athens to unearth the 
roots of our current condition. In Aristotelian ethics, phronesis, trans­
latable perhaps as practical reason (or wisdom),l0 is posited as the 
ability to distinguish good ends from imposters, to discern the 
proper aim of action (praxis) within a moral framework. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that intelligence [phronesis] is a 
state of grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action 
about what is good or bad for a human being (NE, p. 154~ 1140b). 
g or, "The Decline of the Nation-state and the End to the Rights of Man;" J1V, 
pp, 66-7. 69, passim, 
9 For Maclntyre, this chaos is exemplified, in par~ in emotivism and its moral 
cousins: d. AV. chapter 1. passim. 
10 Terence Irwin's translation of phronesis as "intelligence" migh~ given the 
contemporary usage of this term and its correlates. be rather misleading. Irwin 
recognizes the possible problems with this rendering of the term in his translation 
ofthe Nicomacflearl Ethics at pp. 412-13. 
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This differs significantly from the contemporary notion of ratio­
nality I anability thatuncovers the best route to achieve presupposed 
ethical aims; for Aristotle, phronesis itself proposes these aims (AV, 
pp.52-3). 
Aristotle also held a teleological view of human development: to 
remain healthy on the moral, intellectual and spiritual levels, one 
must progress through particular stages of growth from childhood 
through old age. Hence Aristotle might argue that Susan ought to, 
through phronesisl pick those aims that we know contribute to the 
happiness of people a ther stage oflife-development. Thoughstrenu­
ous exercise may be seen as beneficial at one stage of human life, it 
might not help an exhausted 80-year old to realize her telas. That is, 
phronesis distinguishes moral from immoral, or improper, aims 
through human teleology, through the view of human nature that 
demonstrates the proper endpoint of human life and the necessary 
steps wemust take toward reaching our life climax. Finally, Aristotle 
outlines, in Macintyre' slanguage, various "moral precepts" to guide 
one toward one's true end, precepts that enable one to develop a 
virtuous character to guide one in realizing one's felos (A V, pp. 52-3). 
In MacIntyre's view of Aristotelian ethics, then, the three compo­
nents of morality derive meaning from their interrelation; separate one 
from the whole and all quickly lose their coherency and purpose (A V, 
pp.54-5). 
MacIntyre then demonstrates how western moral philosophy 
moved from this basic Aristotelianism, through the Christianity of 
Augustine and then Aquinas, into the 18th century and the Enlight­
enment, resting finally in its present form within contemporary 
analytic discourse and the wider Euro-American culture.ll He char­
acterizes contemporary culture as having retained only the moral 
precepts we inherited from the Greeks, as filtered through Christian 
moral doctrine and its revisions by Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Hume and Kant, as having lost the very support for those precepts: 
Aristotelian teleology and phronesis (A V, pp. 54-7). This current 
predicament stems, inMacintyre' sself-proclaimed "historicist" view. 
from trends already evident in France in 1640, the site of the fireplace 
11 For another broad, historically sensitive philosophical account of the relation 
of the Enlightenment to the rise of instrumental rationality, seeHorkheimer M. and 
T. Adorno, Dinleefie ofEnlightenment. New York: Continuum, 1991. 
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at which Descartes wrote his Meditations, and at the University of 
Padua, 'where Galileo fidgeted withhis new telescopes andpeered at 
the heavens in an astonishing new way. Here, of course, we find the 
birthplace ofmodern science. With it developed a purely instrumen­
tal view ofhuman rationality, a view that replaced phronesis with the 
Reason that founded science, developed the calculus of Leibniz and 
N ewton, led to the founding of the American and French republics, 
and brought to humanity the industrial revolution.12 This newratio­
nality presupposed as already established all human ends and 
goods, and found the most efficient method of obtaining them, but 
itself could find no ends (A V, p. 54-7).13 In this analysis, Macintyre 
rightly po~ts to Hume, whose Treatise on Human Nature appears a 
good century after this new view ofreason takes shape, as a philoso­
pherwho tookreason to exhibit solely aninstrumental function, with 
science andmathematics asits obvious territory. 14Reason, for Hume, 
is "the slave of the passions,"lS a mere efficient calculator of the best 
Ineans to already-determined moral ends (TBN, §III, 3, 3, p. 415). 
Hence, Hume famously, or perhaps infamously, writes: "'Tis not 
contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the 
scratching of my finger" (THN, §III, 3, 3, p. 416). This remained 
significant within western philosophy well into the 19th century, as 
Nietzsche testifies in 1886 in Beyond Good and Evil, when he claims 
that "reason is only an instrument" (BGE, §191). 
The death of phronesis paralleled the equally significant philo­
sophicalloss of teleology. Aristotle might counsel, for instance, to eat 
in moderation, for it will prove difficult to remain in the proper 
physical state in old age if one eats voraciously in one's youth. 
12. Interestingly, Arendt chronicles the perhaps parallel development of praxis 
into modern actior!, a purely instrumental notion whereby the performance itself is 
irrelevant Cf. HC, pp. 228-30. 
1:1 Arendt's discussion of modern science and of the development of modern 
mathcmntics via instrumental rationality parallels in many ways MacIntyre's own 
presentation. C£' HC, "The Discovery of the ArchimedeanPoin~" and also p. 268ft. 
11 Poul Eidclberg suggests that Hobbes can be seen as Hume's historical 
predecessor in this respect. (For his view ofHobhes, he relies on the Leviathan.) He 
bemoi:lns the implicationsofthe view that reason is impotent in the face of emotion 
for 20th century psychology "The Malaise of Modern Psychology," The Journal of 
J>HycJlOlogy Vol. 126 1992; p. 109ff. 
lr, For more on Hume and his 18th century rivals and mentors among the Anglo 
philosophicnl community, d. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics. New York: 
Macmillan, 1966; chapter 12. 
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Because we modemshave lost this perspecti ve on the proper human 
end-state, and even of the successive stages through which human 
life ought to proceed, the mere injunction to eat in moderation lacks 
coherency: it requires rational argument if it is to be followed 
properly, and it is precisely this that it now must do without. 
Macintyre notes, however, that we are not left utterly stranded, 
that we have retained our inheritance from the Enlightenment, a bag 
of rights and of Reason supporting them, but in his view this 
represents a rather problematic inheritance, even a dangerous one 
(AV, pp. 66-7). MacIntyre argues that we have retained the notion of 
the Rights of Man developed in the 18th century, but now lack any 
coherent, rational arguments demonstrating both their existence and 
their necessary moral and social function in late-20th century west­
ern society (AV, 66fj). Yet here is the Enlightenment paradox: it 
simultaneously removed all authority, all foundation, from under 
the medieval moral and political order, and attempted, in part 
through the concept of "rights," to found a new social order without 
any of the old philosophical foundation. As Arendt writes in "What 
is Authority?": 
the revolutions of the modern age appear like gigan­
tic attempts to repair these foundations, to renew the 
broken thread of tradition, and to restore, through 
founding new political bodies, what for so many 
centuries had endowed the affairs of men with som e 
measure of dignity and greatness (BPF, p. 140). 
Put in crude tenns, the predicament that Arendt would surely 
recogruze16is that we lack God, the Catholic Church and Aristotelian 
teleology and phronesis to ground our current moral views, to serve 
as the foundation and guarantor of what have become hu man rights: 
we have dismantled the foundation but somehow retained bits and 
pieces of the roof. Hence, the Enlightenment failed to provide the 
necessary philosophical grounding for the new order.17 Rights are, of 
16 See, e.g., her discussion in "What is Authority" of the end to the Roman 
stabilizing trinity of religion, authority and tradition (BPE, p. 140). 
17InOn Revolution Arendt characterizes modern revolutions assa fundamental, 
so different from other "mere changes" in political life, that they constitute for her 
"beginnings" of new orders (OR, p. 21). 
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cuurse, protected by and developed from within legal orders, but 
MacIntyre notes that they lack coherent philosophical support, and 
therefore could not and cannot serve as the basis for the new moral 
and political order. Equally, they cannot save us today.18 
III. A Quick MacIntyrean Response to Arendt 
N ow I can bring into focus a MacIntyrean criticism of Arendt's 
work on rights and the Enlightenment as a rhetorical device to better 
explicate that work Both philosophers begin their critiques with the 
contention that human rights, since the Second World War, have 
failed to ground moral and political life ,have proven unsuccessful in 
protecting Vulnerable peoples, and perhaps even lack sufficient 
coherency and support to bode well for the future. Once we have 
seen this affinity between their work, the possibility of criticism 
arises, for while MacIntyre might find much in the theoretical 
sections of The Origins of Totalitarianism that he concurs with, he 
might ultimately chide the historically-minded Arendt for failing to 
sufficiently explicate the deeply rooted philosophical forces within 
western culture that have led to the emptiness of current moral and 
political rhetoric. It is precisely because Arendt would be sympa­
thetic to such an account that MacIntyre's disappOintment and 
subsequent critique might arise. For Macintyre, both Europe's philo­
sophical and historical pasts must be understood if contemporary 
philosophers are to develop the necessary tools to critique, under­
mine and replace the current debates over rights with debates 
centered on virtues. Arendt is by no means ignorant of the history of 
philosophy, far from it; yet from MacIntyre's perspective, her his­
torj~al work in (e.g.) The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in 
len/salern is far too caught up in social and political details to notice 
the broad philosophical picture he implores us to consider. Though 
she is clearly aware of the death of phronesis and the demise of 
Aristotelian teleology, she fails to provide this philosophical back­
ground in her analysis of the Enlightenment's failure. This failure 
was ltl.ade possible not simply by European historical events, but also 
by centuries of the slow erosion of our philosophical heritage, 
18 Arendtargues that the Declaration of the Rights ofMan was indeed intended 
to found a new political order for France, and perhaps evenfor Europe (OR. p. 109). 
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leaving only the foam of empty rights at the brim of our collective 
cup. Thus, I do not take MacIntyre-the-historicist to reject the politi­
cal history Arendt provides as irrelevant, but as insufficient, requir­
ing more philosophical analysis and more work in the history of 
philosophy.19 For MacIntyre, a historico-philosophical understand­
ing of this event will secure us, on a communal level, from contem­
porary "barbarism," the very barbarism that Arendt spent her life 
chronicling and fighting (AV, p. 263). 
This MacIntyreanresponse to Arendt's work is, I think, suscep­
tible to what one might call a quantitative solution on Arendt's part. 
Precisely because the Arendt of The Human Condition is aware of the 
rise of instrumental rationality, the use of reason by Descartes and 
Galileo and the end to Aristotelian teleology and the Greek virtues, 
she might integrate more of these philosophical elements into her 
critique of the Enlightenment developed in The Origins ofTotalitari­
anism and elsewhere. As Arendt provides the sort of political history 
MacIntyre characterizes as important, even crucial, to an under­
standing of our present predicament, her work requires philosophi­
cal supplementation to satisfy MacIntyre's criticism. In fact, On 
Revolution looks similar to the sort of histolico-philosophical work 
MacIntyre alludes to-here Arendt recognizes the very sort of "phi­
losopher-influence" on political events MacIntyre chides social his­
torians for down-playing in their scholarship: 
By the same token, I am inclined to think that it was 
precisely the great amount of theoretical concern and 
conceptual thought lavished upon the French Revo­
lution by Europe's thinkers and philosophers which 
conhibuted decisively to its world-wise success, de­
spite its disastrous end (OR, pp. 219-20). 
This MacIntyrean push on Arendt reveals that her work on the 
Enlightenment could be supplemented by more extensive philo­
sophical exegesis on her part. 
19 For MacIntyre, of course, unless we see our p hilosophica\ ills, we will not see 
a new Aristotelianism as the cure to these ills. 
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IV. Arendt's Counter-Critique 
Deutschland, Deutschland Uber alles was, I fear, the end 
of German Philosophy. 
-Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight ofthe Idols 
Arendt is famous for resisting labels. Is she a Jew, existentialist, 
Zionist, Nietzschean, modernist, postmodernist, political theorist, 
Heideggerian, or historian?20 In response to Gershom Scholem's 
question on how to place her, Arendt herselffamously wrote: "If I can 
be said to 'have come from anywhere,' it is from the tradition of 
German phil'o sophy" (Encounter, in Hinchman, p. 435). As might be 
expected, some recent commentators, such as Dana Villa, argue that 
her work has strong Heideggerian and Nietzschean elements, reject­
ing, for example, the claim that she represents a mOdern-day Aristo­
telian, a view apparently defended by Habermas in the past (Villa, 
274ff). Jeffrey Isaac, in turn, chides Villa for ignoring Arendt's 
extensive work on "anti-Semitism, imperialism, the Holocaust, the 
Stalinist usurpation of revolutionary politics, the Cold War balance 
of terror, the' crIses of the republic,'" work he apparently considers 
far more important than the philosophical exegesis in Between Past 
and future Dnd '! he Human Condition that Villa must rely heavily on 
for his interpretation (Isaac, p. 535). Without attempting to settle this 
question-which, in part, seems interesting only in the context of the 
modern-day Arendt industry within academia-I think it fair to say 
that she had significant political and historical concerns throughout 
much of her mature life. I refer to this problem of placement only 
because part of Macintyre's criticism above derives from my charac­
terization, from what I think might be his perspective, of Arendt as 
an "historicist," or at least as an historically-minded philosopher. I 
will now generate an Arendtian response to MacIntyre. In doing so 
2(1 For <1 discussion of Arendt and existentialism, see 1. P. Hinchman and S. K. 
Hinchm<1n, "Arendt's Debt to Jaspers," ReviewofPolit.ics Vol. 531991; pp. 435-68. For 
<1 discuilsion of Arendt's Zionism, see Young-Bruehl. Hmma/! Arendt. For a discus­
sion of tho Nictzschean elements in Arendt's work, see "Beyond Good and Evil: 
Arendt, Niulr.:sche. ,md the AestheticizationofPoliticalAction," Political TheoryVol. 
201992; pp. 274fl Also, Benhabib claims that at least with respect to certain issues, 
Arendt is <1 "political modernist," (p. 168). 
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I will forego the rather obvious move of having her reject the 
historicist label a MacIntyrean might pin on her in favor of a more 
detailed, critical response concerning philosophical methodology 
and, specifically, the proper mode of analysis for dealing with the 
Enlightenment's failure, an event that, in part, led to the barbarism 
both Arendt and MacIntyre identify as a principal component of 
contemporary intellectual and moral life. 
As noted, MacIntyre explicitly adopts an historicist label: he 
considers philosophical arguments and developments within a broad 
historical context, remaining sensitive to significant cultural diver­
gence among the British, French, German, Dutch and other philoso­
phers whose work he represents. For an Arendtian, this approach is 
far more admirable than the ahistorical, and possibly more narrow, 
exegetical work of Anglo-American analytic philosophers, 
MacIntyre's colleagues. Hence the Arendtian criticism of MacIntyre 
concerns neither the relevance of history for philosophy, nor the 
success of the Enlightenment, but is deeper and more substantial 
than these, involving the very nature ofthe failure they both see in the 
18th century articulation of Rights as the guarantors of a stable moral 
system, indeed as the very found a tion of politics for Europeans and 
Americans. For MacIntyre, this is principally a philosophical failure, 
albeit an historically grounded one. This claim becomes the crux of 
my Arendtian critique of MacIntyre. 
In Arend.t's view, the divorce of phHosophy from politics by 
Plato, a separation upheld by nearly every western philosopher in 
what she calls "the tradition," met swiftly with its demise in the mid­
19th century with Marx's last thesis on Feuerbach: "The philoso­
phers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is 
to change it" (Marx, p. 158}.21 Though she may feeinostalgiafor what 
we have lost of the philosophical legacy of Plato and Aristotle,22 
Arendt does welcome a politically-minded, histOrically-specific phi­
losophy, an enterprise combining masses of historical data with 
11 In Arendt's view, serious difficulties and confusions have resulted from 
philosophers' ignorance of the political: for e.g., considering freedom to be <l 
question of the relations among the will, thought, and action, a purely philosophicol 
question divorced from political realities. Cf. BPF, "What is Freedom?" p. 145ff. 
22 On Arendt's nostalgia for pieces of the p hilosop hical tradition she chronicles 
that now lay dead, see Villa, D.R. "Postmodernismand the Public Sphere," American 
Political Science Review Vol. 86, Issue 3 1992; p. 719. 
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broadphilosophical insights , integrating critiques ofindi vidual mem­
bers of the Nazi party with long exegeses of the basic underpinnings 
of Nazism. Arendt's critique of the Enlightenment must be placed 
within this framework, for she considers the failure of the Judeo­
Christian tradition in the 20th century to be political innature, and not 
philosophical, as in MacIntyre's work. In investigating totalitarian­
ism, the climax of this moral collapse, Arendt writes that "the event 
illuminates its own past," for her a political past: her characters are 
not principally Hume, Diderot and Kant, Aristotle, Augustine and 
Aquinas, but Goring, Himmler and Eichmann, Dreyfus, Rhodes and 
Lazare (Young-Bruehl, p. 203).23 
It is here that I can construct Arendt's principal critique of 
MacIntyre: he reads Kant but not Hirnmler, Hurne but not Rhodes, a 
fact that blinds him to the fantastic political failure of the Enlighten­
ment to protect, through rights, the Jews and other peoples that 
became the focal point of the Nazi genocidal program. For Arendt, 
MacIntyre does not venture sufficiently far from traditional philoso­
phy into the tombs of modern history, into anti-semitism, imperial­
ism, racism, into the volumes that chronicle the concentration camps, 
where the JudeO-Christian legacy of founding morality on rights was 
slowly but surely murdered. I must emphasize here "sufficiently 
far," for it is precisely MacIntyre's first steps into historically-based 
philosophy that open him to Arendt's criticism. It would surely be 
useless. if not comedic, to criticize, say, W.V.O. Quine for ignoring 
relevant political events in his .investigations into set theory or 
symbolic logic. But MacIntyre takes seriously the notion of his tori­
cism,24 he considers the Enlightenment's failure to be historically 
specific, and would presumably criticize his colleagues for ignoring 
relevant cultural differences among 18th century philosophers, for 
instance, or for missing the historical development of whatis consid­
ered rational support for a philosophical position. It is precisely this 
2JThis is not to say, of course, that because the failure was political, philosophy 
is irrl'ievant for Arendt. She claimed, in fact, that philosophy too is not entirely free 
of guilt for the Holocaust: "Not of course, in the sense that Hitler somehow had 
something to do with Plato. ". Butin the sense that occidental philosophy never had 
a pure conceptof poli tics and could not have such a concept because italways spoke 
of Man and never dealt with human plurality" (Arendt in Young-Bruehl, p. 255). 
2·j See especially AV, chapter 18, where MacIntyre explicitly proclaims his 
historicism. 
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that makes Arendt's criticism of MacIntyre's work so powerful, for 

. he largely ignores the historical movements to which he claims to be 

sensitive. 
I do think I can develop a MacIntyrean response to this criticism, 
in part because he has been criticized along somewhat similar lines 
by Abraham Edel, of whom MacIntyre writes: 
The gist of his criticism is ... that I focus too much 
attention upon the level of explicit theorizing, articu­
lated concepts, and the stories told about their condi­
tionby various peoples and not enough on the actual 
social and institutional life of those peoples (A V, p. 
271). 
To Edel's sentiment MacIntyre first retorts that social history 
must be far more sensitive to theoretical development than it appears 
to be at present; his work is a step in this direction. Secondly, he 
admits that Edel is in part correct in his criticism, for the narrative of 
After Virtue, i.e. the story of western moral philosophy and its 
apparent downfall, would certainly benefit from more "social and 
institutional history," history that, MacIntyre admits, he largely 
presupposes in this project (A V, pp. 271-2). Frorn MacIntyre's view, 
Isuppose,he could have said far more ofHume'sScotland,Aristotle's 
Athens, the founding of the American and French republics, the 
industrial revolution, and pe!haps even the rise of fascism. He thinks 
that more history would strengthen his narrative; hence he takes 
Edel's criticism to be principally quantitative in character. 
This response to Edel allows me to sharpen what I think would 
be Arendt's critique ofthemethodology impli cit in After Virtue. I take 
Macintyre and Arendt to agree in principle that rights rhetoric, both 
that prevalent in the 18th century, and its contemporary form, to be 
lacking in validity, or to be what we might call empty. For MacIntyre, 
this emptiness is philosophical, owing its existence to the failure of 
moral philosophers to ground rights in. human nature and human 
rationality, to make rights and the moral precepts they entail and 
presuppose philosophically substantial, strong enough to weather the 
coming storm. Arendt rejects this notion, for she unequivocally 
states that human rights never found sufficient grounding, not in 
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humannature and rationality, but in politics, for the era of the 1930s, 
that 
period of political disintegration [that] suddenly and 
unexpectedly made hundreds of thousands of hu­
man beings homeless, stateless, outlawed, and un­
wanted ... could only have happened because the 
Rights of Man, which hadneverbeenphilosophically 
established but merely formulated, which had never 
been politically secured butmerely proclaimed, have, 
in their traditional form, lost all validity (0, p. 447). 
From Arendt's viewpoint, in thinking the emptiness of rights is 
philosophicat, MacIntyre commits a qualitative, indeed fundamental 
error, one not amenable to repair through the mere quantitative 
measures he proposes in response to Edel's attack. 
For an Arendtian,. After Virtue represents a deep 
mischaracterization, not only of the Enlightenment project, but of 
our prese:lt moral and political condition, of the post-tradition era 
we now inhabit. For it is not the present emotivist culture, as 
lvlacIntyr<;;! claims, that both signals and constitutes the 
Enlightenment's failure: it is Auschwitz. 
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